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Introduction  
As the Hong Kong (HK) court held that certain Crimes Ordinance provisions 
which provided for a different age of consent were unconstitutional in August 2005, a 
large part of the presented paper no longer seemed very relevant. However, the court did 
not discuss if cultural relativism and Confucianism were relevant in the judicial analysis. 
The following seeks to answer this question. 
This paper casts doubt on a general cultural relativist argument, as, for example, 
advocated by Dr. Joseph Chan. If this is wrong, homosexuality may still be compatible 
with Confucianism, the influential school of thought in HK, because I) the latter can be 
“re-interpreted” to protect homosexuals‚ interests and II) other Confucian places take 
homosexual rights more seriously than HK.  
Ch 1 Cultural relativism; Confucianism 
Chan’s cultural relativist argument 
Chan (2000a) argues there are universal basic principles of human rights (61), but 
they are only vaguely defined in international law. Elaborating on Michael Walzer’s thick 
and thin account of morality, he argues there are such thin values as the right against 
torture and the right of dissidents not to be suppressed (62), which are universal, in the 
sense that “everyone would immediately recognize as immoral or worthy of 
condemnation” (Id; the author’s emphasis).  
On the other hand, thick values concern, among others, how exactly human rights 
values are to be realized in each country and how much weight exactly is to be given to 
different rights claims and their competing considerations. He argues there are general 
differences between western and Asian cultures. These Asian values are one factor to 
consider in the overall balancing exercise. In this regard, he also strengthens his 
contention by referring to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) doctrine of 
margin of appreciation, arguing that even the state parties to Council of Europe have 
different cultural values. He then makes the statement that the law on homosexuality in 
some Asian states may not be real violations of human rights (2001a 71; the author’s 
emphasis).    
He argues in another article that Confucianism, as represented by Confucius and 
Mencius, is compatible with human rights (1999). He contends that, unlike what some 
others argue to the contrary, Confucianism is not purely relation-based, and “human 
persons are first and foremost moral agents capable of realizing ren, which means, among 
other things, a certain ability of disposition to care for and sympathize others” (217). 
These “others” can be strangers to the person concerned. Thus, s/he can have rights with 
regard to unknown others --- vis-à-vis mere family members, friends, etc. --- in the 
society.  
Second, while Confucianism emphasizes on virtuous relationships between family 
members, rights talk, he maintains, can still be a fallback apparatus. He specifically gives 
the example that a wife should have legal rights if her husband no longer loves her and 
harms her interests.  
Thirdly, he distinguishes later developments of Confucianism from the original 
and argues that Confucius and Mencius do not argue for an absolute obedience on behalf 
of the son/wife/younger brother. As such, their beliefs are less hierarchical --- and thus 
more egalitarian in general --- than some believe. Quoting the much quoted maxim of 
Confucius “we should not impose on others which we do not desire” (XII 2), Chan 
interprets an implied reciprocity out of Confucianism, and argues the emphasis of the 
son’s filial piety goes hand in hand with the parents’ love of their children. This 
reciprocity is again based on ren, which also means, “to love people” (223; see also Ma 
(1995)).  
General Critique  
 Svensson (2002) neatly summarizes the several relationships between human 
rights (HRs) and Confucianism (C): 
i) They are incompatible. 
ii) Some HRs are more compatible with C than others. 
iii) C implicitly entails HRs. 
iv) C is congenial and can nurture HRs 
v) C can contribute to and enrich HRs discourse 
vi) C is superior to HRs and so should displace it (52) 
In HK‘s judicial context, the interplay between human rights and Confucianism is 
unfair: while International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other 
Basic Law (BL) rights provisions enjoy constitutional status (BL art. 11; 39), BL does not 
mention Confucianism at all. It may be included as customary law, but art. 8 of BL 
provides that if it is inconsistent with BL provisions, then the latter prevail. As such, in 
case i) and vi), the court has to disregard Confucianism. Similarly, for ii), where C is 
incompatible with some human rights, the latter prevail. iii) is irrelevant in the present 
discussion. iv) and v) imply compatibility, and Chan’s argument that filial piety, a 
Confucian virtue, can enhance elderly rights, may be an example. 
Another issue is about the proof of a particular cultural value. This is indeed very 
difficult. First, Confucianism has existed for more than 2000 years. Later developments 
may deviate much from the original Confucius thought. Chan’s rejecting latter 
developments of Confucianism concerning absolute obedience of sons, which is also well 
known in modern Chinese society, illustrates this point. Secondly, Chan’s argument also 
illustrates a peculiar situation: modern people, if at all, will normally be more influenced 
by more recent cultural values than by older ones. As such, there needs more discussion 
as to why Confucianism, instead of neo-Confucianism, is chosen to represent the virtue 
of filial piety.  
Third, even concerning the same doctrine, there can be more than one 
interpretation, and modern people tend to enrich the old doctrine with present values. 
However, modern interpretation may contravene the old doctrine. Chan’s example of the 
wife’s right to divorce a bad husband serves as an illustration. Like many other traditional 
thoughts, Confucianism is sexist (see, e.g. Svensson (2000)). It is doubted that Confucius 
would agree with the provision of such a right, or other general women’s rights. A 
misinterpretation may merely hijack the heading of some cultural “values” for a 
reasonable-sounding cultural relativist argument.  
A more fundamental critique of the thick and thin account is how one classifies 
something as thick or thin (c.f. Freeman 1998; Angle 2002). Replying Chan’s 
classification, chat with some HK and Mainland Chinese postgraduate students show that 
not every person readily condemns the suppression of dissidents as immoral. This, they 
contend, may be suitable sacrifice for better focus on economic development in the 
Chinese context. If Rawls’ kind of thought experiment is to be operated on these students, 
then why is not it operated on those who insist on cultural preference without considering 
their genuine moral values? It is not to argue all traditional values are worthless, but 
cultural values should not, without any moral evaluation, count as a factor to balance 
away rights claims (c.f. Freeman (1995; 1998); Ghai (1995)). To the extent that cultural 
concerns are reflected in the democratic process, the judicial deference to the legislature 
already considers the rights-limiting desire of the majority. Culture and deference should 
not double count in a judicial review. An analogy is the role of religion in a secular state 
(Ghai, 1996: 54). 
Chan also sought support from the margin of appreciation doctrine. However, 
after Dudgeon v UK (1981, ECHR), the doctrine only defeats homosexuality claims once 
(Frette v France, 2002) in ECHR. The case was not concerned with culture, but with 
scientific evidence. Homophobic law and policies, albeit supported by the majority’s 
conventional cultural values, still lost to homosexuals’ interests. As such, even if the 
thick and thin account applies, gays’ sexual privacy and right to non-discrimination lean 
more toward the “thin” side.  
Ch 2 Confucianism and homosexuality 
If the author is wrong on the above critique of the cultural relativist argument, 
then it is important to explore how Confucianism may affect homosexuality claims.  
Homosexuality and Chinese history in brief 
Homosexual acts have existed in China for several thousand years. Not few 
(male) emperors had male lovers (see, e.g. Xiaomingxiong (1997). It served as a “show-
off” for the rich men to have young sexual partners of both sexes, although the young 
males had low social status (Xiaomingxiong (1997); Chou (2000); Sang (2003)).  
As to whether it is moral, there are two similar views: after a quite comprehensive 
historical study, Xiaomingxiong concludes there is “implicit homophobia” --- vis-à-vis 
the “explicit” one under Christian values --- in Chinese history (1997: 6-8). The other 
thought, which may also be derived from Xiaomingxiong’s study, is that gay acts were 
accepted in some contexts (above), as long as the participants still got married and 
fulfilled the procreative duty. No Confucian doctrine is specifically against homosexual 
act (Chou (2000)).  
Since the 13th Century, however, neo-Confucianism promoted general sexual 
conservatism --- “removed human desire” (c.f. Chou (2000)). Under the influence of this 
school and others, a criminal code prohibited sex outside marriage in Qing Dynasty, 
under which homosexual acts were first sanctioned (Ruskola (1994)). Nevertheless, the 
enforcement of this law was selective, and some local communities were willing to 
approve homosexual marriages (Ibid).  
Rights-limiting claim 1: Filial Piety 
 Filial piety is very important in Confucian thoughts (see, e.g. Mencius: IV A 19). 
Moreover, many HK Chinese have heard of this: “There are three ways of being a bad 
son, the most serious is to have no heir.” (Mencius: IV A 26). As such, if a causal 
relationship can be established between homosexuality and having no heir, then a cultural 
relativist court may find an additional justification for supporting the existing criminal 
law. 
  The court may consider the different age of consent as two possibilities: first, for 
a 17-year-old boy, if he has sex with another male, has hetero/bi- sexual relationship and 
procreates in the later part of his life, then he should not be regarded as unfilial in the 
above sense. In the second case, if the same boy remains homosexual after his first gay 
sex and does not procreate, then he seems unfilial.  
However, if this argument is to be employed, the government has to establish 
there are much more case 2 than case 1. It is because people under case 1 are wrongly 
punished. If there is substantial number of case 1, then the unequal age is over-inclusive. 
It can also be argued that even if there are only a few case 1 cases, they should anyway 
not be punished, not to mention the life sentence for anal sex. Second, there does not 
seem any authoritative interpretation of “having no heir” as requiring that offspring be 
born biologically. Quite the contrary, “kim-tiu” adoption was accepted in Chinese 
tradition (Leonard, 1994: 278-280). As such, case 2 males may also adopt in order to 
fulfill their filial duty. Natural relationship may be preferred to adoption, but the 
government has to justify the use of criminal sanction to enforce the preference.  
Third, in case 2, the government also has to show that gay sex for a male aged 16- 
21 will lead him not to procreate in later part of his life. Gay act may not be his first 
sexual experience. It is possible that he has sexual experience with females before the gay 
act, but he happens to remain exclusively homosexual after that. This leads to the further 
argument that there is an external factor for the coincidence, namely that his gay 
orientation is fixed earlier than 16-21, which causes to him to prefer gay sex during his 
whole life. S.L. v Austria (ECHR, 2003) rules this is what the majority of scientific 
evidence points to. Counter scientific evidence has to show a racial difference between 
Caucasians and Chinese (and there is non-Chinese population in HK). Anyway, no 
lawmaker has noticeably run this specific argument in the 1990 partial decriminalization 
debate (LC 1990/1). If the court is to run this argument, it should not claim deference to 
the legislature. 
Considering the larger picture, many HK heterosexual couples choose not to 
procreate, but there is no criminal sanction on them. Last but not least, there is no 
criminal sanction for being unfilial per se. While one may cite the tax benefits for 
children who support their old parents as a legal enforcement of filial piety (Inland 
Revenue Ordinance ss 26D, 30A), the use of criminal law to enforce filial piety, which is 
even not done by the legislature, is far from a generous interpretation of rights provisions. 
Rights limiting claim 2: Sexual conservativism  
 As mentioned above, neo-Confucianism deviated from Confucianism by 
promoting general sexual conservatism. Chan’s very brief argument on culture and 
homosexuality (Ch 1) may be based on this. On the other hand, he seems to buy 
Confucianism more than neo-Confucianism on the issue of absolute obedience to parents 
(Ch 1). The question of whether the former or the latter is adopted as representing HK 
cultural tradition is significant. If one adopts the neo- school, should s/he also adopt the 
unreasonable absolute obedience on behalf of the son of that school? Lastly, to the extent 
that heterosexual group sex is unregulated in modern HK, the selective sexual 
conservatism against gays is unconvincing.  
Confucianism and Rights claims 1--- privacy 
 While some contemporary scholars explore the possibility of deducing rights-
compatible interpretations from Confucianism by reconstructing the latter for modern 
needs, this part also makes such an attempt in the homosexuality context. 
There does not seem any noticeable Confucian maxim on the protection of 
privacy. Two quotes are however noted: 
i)  “Do not look unless it is in accordance with the rites; do not listen unless it is 
in accordance with the rites…” (Confucius XII 1) 
ii) “… whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not human…” (Mencius II A 6) 
Confucius does not define what exactly are impolite to see and listen. Similarly, 
Mencius does not state under what circumstances will one feel shameful. However, it 
should be very possible to include seeing others’ sexual activities as impolite and 
shameful. The focal point is not the actor’s rights, but others who may disturb the actor’s 
private act. As such, while Confucianism does not derive human rights, the two can be 
compatible concerning privacy. Chan (1999) gives two examples --- the compulsory test 
of urine for drugs in Singapore and on the compulsory check of identity cards in HK --- 
and argues privacy is given lesser value in these places. This human rights situation in 
Singapore, like such many others as death penalty and corporal punishment for prisoners, 
should not be applicable to HK and other places. Moreover, they are not about sexual 
privacy and so can be distinguished from the present discussion.  
 Lastly, to reiterate the importance of privacy, the demand of the right is not 
selfish, but serves as positive empowerment for one’s life (Twiss, 1998). The demand of 
privacy in the gay context is not individualistic either, for the relevant law affect the 
whole gay population.  
Confucianism and rights claim 2 --- Equality  
 As stated in Ch 1, Confucianism is sexist. It is thus not surprising that modern 
interpretation of Confucianism can support homophobic assumptions: Gay sex makes 
men, especially the penetrated, less manly, thus frustrating the patriarchal assumption of 
Confucianism. However, to the extent sexism is objectionable based on women’s 
interests, which are protected under HK’s constitution, Confucianism should not have 
much application here. 
Confucianism and rights claim 3 --- personal development and human dignity 
 Confucianism is quite expansive on how to become a “moral Gentleman”. He 
should advance himself by self-exploration and fulfillment (see, e.g. Mencius: IV B 14) 
(c.f. Chan 1999).   
 De Bary interprets the work of Confucius and Mencius as arguing that for 
individual's self development, s/he has to be true to her/his “innermost self” (1998: 24). 
The problem of self-denial and low self-esteem of some gay men under the general 
homophobic environment is well established. In order to relieve this problem, they, in 
general, should be allowed to be true to their sexual orientation.  
 Three maxims may also indicate how one should deal with gays. The first is the 
reciprocity illustrated by Chan: “Do not impose on others what you yourself do not 
desire” (Chan, 1998: 218). When the heterosexual majority does not want their private 
consensual sex to be interfered, they should respect that of the gay minority.  
The second concerns the Mencius maxim on the heart of compassion, which was 
also quoted by Chan above (1999: 218). This heart entails the natural concern for the 
suffering of a human person. Chan seems to agree that the application of the doctrine 
should not be limited to life-and-death situation, but less serious sufferings are also 
caught. The grave psychological suffering of and real life discrimination against gays are 
well established by Canadian Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court. 
The maxim should be reconstructed to protect gays’ interests. 
Lastly, as discussed above, Chan and Ma emphasize filial piety goes alongside 
with parents’ love/kindness. So why do not they respect their son for exercising his moral 
agency to be gay? (c.f. Twiss (1998)) 
 The above establishes the possibility of a gay-friendly Confucian interpretation.  
Contemporary China, Taiwan, etc. and homosexuality  
There should be caution about the examination of mainland China’s law, 
especially human rights law, but it is examined to show how Confucianism is applied to 
homosexual acts in the origin of the school of thought. The recent criminal law reform 
repealed a provision which had been used to prosecute gays (art. 293, Criminal Code of 
People’s Republic of China 1997). There is arguably also a same age of consent (see art. 
236(2) of the Code). Moreover, the Chinese Psychiatric Association removed 
homosexuality from the list of illness (Zheng 2001). Last but not least, the authority has 
recently endorsed a transsexual’s marriage (People’s Daily Online, 2004). All these point 
to a more egalitarian model concerning sexual orientation in China. 
Taiwan is also influenced, if not much more than China, by Confucianism. It 
provides for the same age of consent (art. 227, Criminal Code). It is even legislating on a 
civil partnership bill (ILGHRC (2003)).  
To conclude this part, China and Taiwan, the former being the origin of 
Confucianism and the latter still much upholding its values, are more gay-friendly than 
HK. HKG lacks an explanation as to what cultural values make HK particularly 
homophobic.  
Conclusion 
 Ch 2 argues that Confucianism is not very homophobic when compared with 
traditional Christian thoughts. There may be tension between filial piety and gay rights, 
but it is only to a limited extent. The neo-Confucian claim of sexual conservatism 
deviates with previous thoughts, and the gross indecency provisions concerning 
consensual group gay sex in private are anyway unconvincingly selective.  
On the other hand, a modern re-interpretation of Confucianism may strengthen the 
western-originated privacy and human dignity rights. To the extent that inequality 
dominates behind the thoughts and so must be rejected by human rights concern, any 
Confucian interpretation for discrimination against gay acts should also be discarded. The 
study of the relevant law of China and Taiwan also confirms that Confucianism is either 
compatible with a same age of consent, or not strong enough to outweigh the concern for 
the latter in those places. As such, there does not seem any serious cultural reason to 
counter rights claims of gays, let alone the doubt in Ch 1 on whether cultural relativism 
should be recognized by the court at all. 
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